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IN ENRON'S WAKE: CORPORATE
EXECUTIVES ON TRIAL
KATHLEEN F. BRICKEY*
There may never have been a worse time to be a corporate criminal.
I wish we had never heard of Bernie Ebbers.
I. INTRODUCTION
It was December, 2001-a few months after Enron CEO Ken Lay was
warned of an "elaborate accounting hoax" 3 that had disguised fraud on a
magnificent scale, and not long after Enron had publicly disclosed record
fourth quarter shortfalls. Notwithstanding these dire financial straits, Enron
executives behaved like pigs at the trough, doling out more than $100
million in bonuses to themselves and delivering the checks by plane on the
eve of the largest corporate bankruptcy filing in United States history.4 It
soon became evident that Enron's collapse was only the first in a wave of
accounting fraud scandals that would inflict huge financial losses and erode
public confidence in the nation's financial markets.
Fast forward to December, 2005. Ken Lay and two other top Enron
executives, former President and CEO Jeff Skilling and Chief Accounting
James Carr Professor of Criminal Jurisprudence, Washington University School of
Law. I am grateful to Jim Brickey for his inspiration and unflagging support, and to Darren
Grady and Barry Wormser for their able research assistance.
1 Shawn Young & Peter Grant, More Pinstripes to Get Prison Stripes, WALL ST. J., June
20, 2005, at C 1.
2 Suzanne Craig, Citigroup Quells Investor Claim over Research: Panel Rejects Charge
That Analyst Misled Client on WorldCom Stock; Victory Highlights Trend on Street, WALL
ST. J., Dec. 8, 2005, at C1 (quoting Citigroup CEO Charles Prince).
3 Anonymous Memorandum from Sherron Watkins, Vice President of Corporate
Development, Enron, to Kenneth Lay, Chairman, Enron (Aug. 15, 2001) [hereinafter
Anonymous Watkins Memorandum] (on file with author).
4 Official Employment-Related Issues Comm. of Enron Corp. v. Arnold (In re Enron
Corp.), No. 01-16034, at 20 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Dec. 9, 2005) (Mem.) (on file with author).
The bankruptcy court later determined that many of these transfers were fraudulent and
ordered the money returned. Id at 98.
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Officer Richard Causey, were then under indictment and only a month away
from their criminal trial. 5  But here, the customary pretrial courtroom
maneuvers were embellished by Lay's strategic effort to regain public
relations momentum.
Speaking before a group of 500 Houston business and academic
leaders, Lay blamed Enron's downfall on a handful of bad apples 6 and-
perhaps borrowing a leaf from Mark Twain's album7 -claimed that most of
what had been said about Enron's demise was either "grossly exaggerated"
or just plain wrong.8 Moreover, he charged, the Enron Task Force, which
spearheads Enron-related investigations and prosecutions, had unleashed a
"wave of terror" through the relentless pursuit of innocent businessmen, the
bullying of witnesses, and a host of other prosecutorial excesses.
9
Following closely on the heels of Lay's highly charged speech, co-
defendant Rick Causey rearranged the legal landscape for the trial by
striking a deal with the prosecutors and agreeing to cooperate.' 0 Former
5 The charges against Lay were far more limited than those against his co-defendants and
former colleagues Jeff Skilling (former Enron President and CEO) and Rick Causey (former
Enron Chief Accounting Officer). See Indictment, United States v. Causey, CRH-04-25
(S.D. Tex. Jan. 21, 2004) (on file with author).
6 But for "the illegal conduct of less than a handful of employees," he charged, Enron
would not have needed to seek protection in bankruptcy. Kenneth L. Lay, Speech, "Guilty,
Until Proven Innocent" (Dec. 13, 2005) [hereinafter Lay Speech] (on file with author).
7 After the American press mistakenly published his obituary, Twain sent a cable from
London declaring that "reports of my death are greatly exaggerated." THE NEW DICTIONARY
OF CULTURAL LITERACY 137 (E.D. Hirsch, Jr. et al. eds., 2002).
8 "Most of what was and is still being said ... is either grossly exaggerated, distorted, or
just flat out false." Lay Speech, supra note 6.
9 Id. In taking this stance, he joined a chorus of other Justice Department critics who had
been caught up in the prosecutorial net. See, e.g., Jonathan D. Glater, Indictment Broadens
in Shelters at KPMG, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 2005, at Cl (quoting defense lawyers
representing two of seventeen defendants in the KPMG tax shelter prosecution, who charged
that prosecutors are taking "a misguided, overly aggressive, unprecedented view of a
complicated legal area" and are "seriously overreaching" in bringing the charges);
HealthSouth: Scrushy Enters Not Guilty Plea to Charges He Bribed Governor, Cm. TRIB.,
Oct. 29, 2005, at C2 (reporting that Richard Scrushy's lawyer claimed that Scrushy's
indictment for political bribery was a product of overzealous prosecutors); Gretchen
Ruethling, Four Additional Charges for Black in Hollinger Case, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16,
2005, at C4 (quoting Conrad Black's lawyer, who characterized new charges against his
client as "unfounded" and "a blatant example of overreaching by the prosecutor"); Press
Release, Arthur Andersen, LLP, Statement by Arthur Andersen, LLP (Mar. 14, 2002)
(asserting that prosecution of the accounting firm would be unjust and "an extraordinary
abuse of prosecutorial discretion") [hereinafter Andersen Mar. 14 Press Release] (on file
with author).
10 John R. Emshwiller & John M. Biers, Enron Prosecutors Gain New Ally: Causey Plea
May Offer Look into Top Officers' Actions Before Company 's Collapse, WALL ST. J., Dec.
29, 2005, at A3.
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Enron Treasurer Andy Fastow, who was widely credited with engineering
much of the Enron fraud, had already pled guilty and been cooperating for
more than a year."1 Causey's last minute defection, while not widely
anticipated, was not without precedent. Surprise plea agreements reached
on the eve of the Rite Aid trial, for example, left Rite Aid's Chief Legal
Officer holding the bag.
12
It is axiomatic that most criminal cases are resolved through guilty
pleas, and the recent corporate fraud prosecutions are no exception. And,
like Fastow and Causey, most corporate executives who have pled guilty
have also become cooperating witnesses, agreeing to help the government
build criminal cases against their former colleagues and friends.
I have written elsewhere about this building block technique and how
it facilitates charging higher-ups like Skilling and Lay. 13 But this article
turns to that rarer phenomenon of post-Enron prosecutions---cases that have
actually gone to trial.
We know relatively little about the corporate fraud trials because
executives on trial have been relatively few and far between. It has taken
roughly three years for these prosecutions to reach the trial stage and yield
enough trial-related data to report and analyze.14  Thus, until now, our
1 Lay publicly placed most of the blame for Enron's woes at Fastow's feet. Lay Speech,
supra note 6. Since Fastow had been accused of reaping enormous profits from the fraud
and Causey had not, the addition of Causey to the prosecution's team was a strategic
government home run. In addition, there was some suggestion that the defense lawyers
would try to smear Fastow in the jury's eyes by introducing evidence of pornography habits
"so extensive that when his computer files were seized they were submitted to the FBI for
criminal investigation." Carrie Johnson, Lawyers Take Aim at Enron Witnesses, WASH.
POST, Jan. 10, 2006, at D3 (quoting unspecified court filings submitted by the defense).
12 See infra Appendix 1, at Rite Aid; see also Ex-Chief Pleads Guilty in RiteAid Case,
N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 2003, at CIO; 2 Defendants in Rite Aid Case Expected to Plead Guilty
Today, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 2003, at C6; Former Rite Aid Office Pleads Guilty, N.Y. TIMES,
June 6, 2003, at C4; Mark Maremont, Rite Aid's Former Vice Chairman Doesn't Plead
Guilty as Expected, WALL ST. J., June 27, 2003, at A8; Mark Maremont, Rite Aid's Ex-CEO
Pleads Guilty: Grass Is First Executive Held Criminally Liable in Major Accounting Fraud,
WALL ST. J., June 18, 2003, at A3; cf Ex-Lawyerfor Rite Aid Is Found Guilty, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 18, 2003, at C2; Rite Aid Ex-Counsel Is Convicted: Guilty Verdict Marks First by a Jury
in Current Crop of Corporate Scandals, WALL ST. J., Oct. 20, 2003, at C8.
13 Kathleen F. Brickey, Enron's Legacy, 8 BUFF. CRIM. L. REv. 221, 263-75 (2004)
[hereinafter Brickey, Enron 's Legacy]; Kathleen F. Brickey, From Enron To WorldCom and
Beyond: Life and Crime After Sarbanes-Oxley, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 357, 370-75 (2003)
[hereinafter Brickey, Enron to WorldCom and Beyond].
14 In Brickey, Enron's Legacy, supra note 13, at 275, I examined the criminal
enforcement environment and explored some of the principal characteristics of major
corporate fraud prosecutions, including parallel civil and criminal enforcement activity,
charging practices in criminal cases, and disposition of criminal charges. As few cases had
2006]
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knowledge about these trials has been largely anecdotal. But after a brief
hiatus following Arthur Andersen's obstruction of justice conviction in
2002,15 high profile executives began to find themselves in the dock-
beginning with Adelphia CEO John Rigas (guilty), WorldCom CEO Bernie
Ebbers (guilty), HealthSouth CEO Richard Scrushy (not guilty), 16 and
Enron CEOs Jeff Skilling and Ken Lay (currently on trial).
Now that we are deeply enough into the prosecution cycle that major
cases have been tried, jury verdicts returned, and sentences imposed, this
seems an opportune time to take a closer look at these prosecutions through
the prism of newly compiled data on the trials. Although the number of
cases is relatively small, the data set provides the most comprehensive
picture of executives on trial available to date.
Part II of this article addresses a range of questions about corporate
fraud trials and verdicts. Which and how many cases have gone to trial,
who has been tried, and what is a typical outcome? Does the government
enjoy a high degree of success at trial, or are high-profile executives more
likely to win juries over to their side? Part II addresses these and other core
trial-related questions.
Part III then turns to the flip side of the coin-cases that have ended in
mistrials-and considers whether mistrials have been major government
setbacks. How often have mistrials been declared? What factors come into
play when a trial ends without a verdict? Were cases that ended in mistrials
flawed from the outset? Are prosecutors' decisions about whether to retry a
defendant a reliable gauge of the relative strength of the case? Are
decisions to retry accompanied by discernable shifts in trial strategy? Part
III provides a framework for taking a preliminary look at this intriguing set
of issues.
yet gone to trial at that time, the dispositions consisted primarily of guilty pleas, with a
smattering of verdicts, mistrials, and dismissals.
15 After a month-long trial, Andersen was convicted on the single count indictment
charging the firm with violating 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(2) (2000). United States v. Arthur
Andersen, LLP, 374 F.3d 281, 284 (6th Cir. 2004), rev'd 125 S. Ct. 2129 (2005); see
Kathleen F. Brickey, Andersen's Fall from Grace, 81 WASH U. L.Q. 917 (2003). The
Supreme Court later reversed, holding that the trial court's instructions did not correctly
inform the jury of the mens rea required to prove a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b). Arthur
Andersen, LLP v. United States, 125 S. Ct. 2129, 2136-37 (2005). The government
ultimately decided not to retry the now-defunct firm and did not object to a motion made by
David Duncan, the government's star cooperating witness in the Andersen case, to withdraw
his guilty plea. John R. Emshwiller, Andersen Figure Files to Withdraw His Guilty Plea,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 23, 2005, at C3.
16 Scrushy has since been indicted on unrelated federal political bribery charges and is
now awaiting trial. Milt Freudenheim, Scrushy Faces New Charges of Bribing State
Officials, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 2005, at C18.
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II. CORPORATE FRAUD TRIALS AND VERDICTS
A. TRIAL DATA
The data set used in this article covers the period March 2002 through
January 2006 and is derived from my ongoing study of major corporate
fraud prosecutions. 17  Although the full data base is far more
comprehensive, this article extrapolates data relating to fraud cases that had
gone to trial as of January 31, 2006,18 and tracks trials relating to scandals at
seventeen major companies and firms (Table 1). As of the end of January
2006, forty-six defendants had gone to trial in twenty-three separate
prosecutions.
As a general rule, prosecutors typically charge multiple defendants in
corporate fraud cases, 19 and this charging pattern is apparent in the cases
that have gone to trial. More than two-thirds of the trials included in Table
1 had multiple defendants. Although four or more defendants were jointly
tried in a handful of cases, 20 in most instances, no more than two defendants
went to trial.
Table 1 does not, however, convey the full scope of the government's
charging practices because it does not include co-defendants who bargained
with prosecutors and did not go to trial. When those who entered guilty
pleas are added to the mix, prosecutors charged three or more defendants in
a third of the cases they tried. And when we include co-defendants who
pled guilty while their colleagues went to trial, the total number of
individuals charged in these cases will increase to sixty.
17 An earlier version of the complete data set was published in Brickey, Enron To
WorldCom and Beyond, supra note 13, app. A, at 382-401. The earlier iteration, which
tracked nearly sixty prosecutions arising out of fraud scandals at seventeen major
corporations, covered the period March 2002-August 2003. As many of the cases charged
multiple defendants, the database tracked charges against more than ninety defendants. I
updated and analyzed much of that data in a more recent article, Enron's Legacy. See
Brickey, Enron 's Legacy, supra note 13, at 225-28, 245-75.
18 A table containing the extrapolated data appears infra Appendix 1.
19 See Brickey, Enron to WorldCom and Beyond, supra note 13, app. A, at 382-401.
20 Four defendants were on trial in the Adelphia and Qwest trials. See United States v.
Rigas, infra Appendix 1, at Adelphia; United States v. Graham, id. at Qwest. In the three
Enron-related trials that had multiple defendants, six defendants were jointly tried in one
case, see United States v. Bayly, id. at Enron, five went to trial in another, see United States































Guilty pleas are critical to the government's successful pursuit of
corporate fraud cases in two important respects. First, they are numerically
significant. In a baseline study of prosecutions completed between March
2i Table 1 does not include retrials following mistrials, see infra Table 6 and text
accompanying notes 95-97, but includes other trials currently in progress.
22 Three of the four Enron-related trials had multiple defendants. See United States v.
Bayly, infra Appendix 1, at Enron; United States v. Rice, id.; United States v. Causey, id.
23 Only one of the lmClone trials had multiple defendants. See United States v. Stewart
(Martha), id. at ImClone.
24 Tyco is the only state prosecution included in the trial data base.
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2002 and July 2004, for example, charges against eighty-seven defendants
were resolved.25 But while more than ninety percent of the outcomes were
convictions, only about ten percent of the convictions were products of jury
verdicts. Simply put, these cases were overwhelmingly resolved through
guilty pleas (Table 2).
Table 2
Disposition of Charges in Federal Corporate Fraud Prosecutions
26
March 2002 - July 2004
Hung Awaiting
Guilty Plea Conviction Acquittal Jury Dismissal Trial
73 8 4 2 2 43
Second, guilty pleas are strategically significant. Virtually all of the
defendants who pled guilty during that two-year period became cooperating
witnesses 27 who assisted the government in developing cases against their
28peers.
In the current study, while guilty pleas were less prevalent in the
twenty-three cases that went to trial, one or more co-defendants entered
guilty pleas in nearly a third of those cases. With only a few exceptions,29
the defendants who pled guilty became cooperating witnesses.
25 This figure excludes two trial defendants whose juries had deadlocked.
26 Table 2 includes criminal charges in the following fraud investigations: Adelphia,
Cendant, Charter Communications, Credit Suisse First Boston, Dynegy, Enron, HealthSouth,
Homestore, ImClone, Kmart, McKesson HBOC, NewCom, NextCard, PurchasePro, Qwest,
Rite Aid, Symbol Technologies, Tyco (federal charge only), and WorldCom (federal charges
only). Table 2 was originally published as Table 6 in Brickey, Enron's Legacy, supra note
13, at 264.
27 The defendants included in Table 2 who pled guilty but did not enter into cooperation
agreements are ImClone President and CEO Sam Waksal, see United States v. Waksal, infra
Appendix 1, at ImClone; Enron Treasurer Ben Glisan, see United States v. Glisan, id. at
Enron; and two executives in the NewCom prosecutions, see United States v. Kahn, id. at
NewCom. Enron's Glisan, who is serving a five-year term, is reportedly cooperating from
prison. Mary Flood, The Fall of Enron: Prisoner Goes to See Grand Jury; Enron Ex-
Official Likely Cooperating, Hous. CHRON., Mar. 5, 2004, Bus. Sec., at 1.
28 For a more extended discussion of how prosecutors have used cooperating witnesses to
build cases against higher-ups in the corporation, see Brickey, Enron's Legacy, supra note
13, at 263-75.
29 The two defendants in the NewCom case who entered guilty pleas did not enter into
cooperation agreements. See United States v. Khan, infra Appendix 1, at NewCom.
Similarly, the defendant who pled guilty in the Impath case does not appear to have agreed
to cooperate. See United States v. Adelson, id. at Impath.
2006]
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Table 3
Cases Tried with Guilty Pleas by Co-Defendants
Guilty Not Guilty Guilty Pleas by
Company Verdicts Verdicts Mistrials Co-Defendants
Adelphia 2 1 1 1
Duke Energy 0 1 1 1
Dynegy 1 0 0 2
Enron31 0 0 5 3
Impath 1 0 0 1
NewCom 2 1 0 2
Rite Aid 1 0 0 3
This does not, however, portray the full importance of cooperating
witnesses in these trials. There are numerous separate but related cases in
which defendants pled guilty and agreed to help prosecutors develop cases
against, among others, defendants who ultimately went to trial (Table 4).
Given the prevalence of guilty pleas and their pivotal role in these
investigations, the question then becomes who actually goes to trial?
Prosecutors have been chided for not aiming high enough and being content
to charge mid-level managers whose guilt is easier to prove. But is it true
that those in the middle are relegated to the role of scapegoat while the
higher-ups enjoy a free pass? If the trial data are a reliable indicator, quite
the opposite is true. Most of the defendants on trial have been high-level
executives who held positions of responsibility and authority within their
respective organizations.32
30 By number of defendants affected. Includes partial acquittal accompanied by hung
jury on other charges; does not include or reflect disposition after mistrial was declared.
31 Only two of the Enron prosecutions that have gone to trial (United States v. Rice, see
infra Appendix 1, at Enron, and United States v. Causey, id.) had co-defendants who became
cooperating witnesses. But, in another, Enron Treasurer Ben Glisan, who pled guilty in a
separate case but did not enter into a cooperation agreement, was granted immunity in
exchange for his testimony in United States v. Bayly, see id.; 10 Enron Players: Where They
Landed After the Fall, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 29, 2006, § 3, at 10, and in the trial of Skilling and
Lay. Alexei Barrionuevo, Ex-Treasurer Testifies Skilling Left Enron in Weak Shape, N.Y.
TImES, Mar. 22, 2006, at C3.
32 This conclusion is fully consistent with an earlier sampling from the data base that was
not limited to defendants who elected to go to trial. See Brickey, Enron's Legacy, supra
note 13, at 255-56.
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Table 4






















33 United States v. Arthur Andersen, L.L.P. See infra Appendix 1, at Enron.
34 United States v. Rice, id.
35 United States v. Bayly, id Enron Treasurer Ben Glisan, who pled guilty in a separate
case but did not enter into a cooperation agreement, was granted immunity in exchange for
his testimony in Bayly.
36 United States v. Scrushy, id. at HealthSouth.
37 United States v. Thomson, id.
38 United States v. Crumpler, id. These numbers are derived from reports of others who
pled guilty and testified against the defendant. Because the underlying fraud in this case is
intertwined with the overall fraudulent scheme, it is possible that other defendants who were
cooperating witnesses in United States v. Scrushy (Case 1), id., also assisted in developing
the case against the defendant in Crumpler.
39 United States v. Stewart (Martha), id. at ImClone.
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Table 4 (continued)
Cooperating Witnesses in Separate but Related Prosecutions
Related Cases With Cooperating
Company Cooperating Witnesses Witnesses
McKesson HBOC 2 2
NewCom 1 1
Ogilvy & Mather 0 0
Qwest 1 1
Rite Aid 2 2
Tyco 0 0
Westar Energy 0 0
WorldCom 4 5
Of the forty-six defendants who have gone to trial, twelve held the title
of Chief Executive Officer, Chief Operating Officer, President, Chairman of
the Board or, in the case of a partnership, Senior Partner.4' Defendants on
trial also included five Chief Financial Officers42 and an assortment of other
financial and accounting executives.43 There were also seven Executive or
Senior Vice presidents, five Investment Advisors, a Chief Legal Officer,
and a Vice President for Legal Affairs.44 Only one entity, Arthur Andersen,
has gone to trial to date.45
40 United States v. Stewart (Larry), id.
41 Those in this group were high level executives at Adelphia, Cendant, Enron
Broadband Services, HealthSouth, Impath, Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Ogilvy &
Mather (Senior Partner and Executive Group Director), Tyco, Westar, and WorldCom. See
infra Appendix 1.
42 They were CFOs of Adelphia, McKesson HBOC, NewCom, Ogilvy & Mather, and
Qwest. See infra Appendix 1.
43 Among the accounting and financial executives were three vice presidents, a controller
and an assistant controller, and officers who held the titles of Director of Internal Reporting,
Accountant and Senior Division Director, and Senior Director of Transactional Accounting.
The breakdown and affiliations of these defendants is shown in fuller detail infra Appendix
1.
4 The breakdown and affiliations of these defendants is shown in fuller detail infra
Appendix 1. The remaining defendants who are not mentioned in the previous enumeration
of defendants who went to trial include two vice presidents and a Secret Service Lab
employee who was charged with lying when he testified as an expert witness for the
government in Martha Stewart's trial.
45 See supra note 15.
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B. VERDICTS
The trials tracked in this study have produced surprisingly mixed
results. Juries have convicted eighteen defendants, acquitted eleven, and
deadlocked on charges against fifteen others. Thus, at first blush, the
government's trial record does not reflect overwhelming success and
appears to validate-or at least provide support for-the criticism that
prosecutors have overreached by trying to find crimes where none really
exist.
46
Introduction of another variable-how juries function when defendants
are jointly tried-may help to flesh out the picture and provide a baseline
for assessing the strength of cases the government takes to trial. Do juries
tend to accept or reject the government's case in its entirety when
defendants are jointly tried? That is, do they tend to convict or acquit all of
the defendants on trial? If so, that signals that the prosecution's case, in
toto, was relatively strong or weak. Or, in the alternative, do juries tend to
hand down split verdicts (i.e., some combination of guilty, not guilty, or
deadlocked) when multiple defendants are on trial? If so, do the split
verdicts shed light on the overall merits of the case? Table 5 sets the stage
for analyzing these points.
46 See, e.g., Kathy M. Kristof & Josh Friedman, KPMG Tax Case Grows: Ten More
People Are Indicted over Alleged Fraudulent Shelters Promoted by the Firm, L.A. TIMES,
Oct. 18, 2005, at C1 (reporting that one defendant's lawyer said the prosecutors were
"seriously overreaching in this case"); Andersen Mar. 14 Press Release, supra note 9
(asserting that prosecution of the accounting firm would be unjust and "an extraordinary
abuse of prosecutorial discretion"); John R. Emshwiller, An Ambitious Enron Defense:
Company's Moves Were All Legal; with $40 Million War Chest, Skilling Calls on Lawyer
with Business Expertise; Hiring a Sociology Professor, WALL ST. J., Jan. 20, 2006, at Al
(reporting that defense lawyers will argue that the indictment of Skilling and Lay targets
what in reality are ordinary business and accounting decisions); Lay Speech, supra note 6
(claiming that the Enron Task Force failed to meet its projected time table for bringing all
Enron-related indictments, not because the cases were complicated, but "because it is
complicated to find crimes where they do not exist").
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Company Convictions Acquittals Mistrials
Adelphia 2 1 1
Cendant 1 0 1
CSFB 0 0 1
Duke Energy 0 1 1
Dynegy 1 0 0
Enron
Case 114 0 0
Case 249  5 1 0
Case 350 0 0 5
HealthSouth
Case 15 1  0 1 0
Case 252  0 2 0
Case 353 1 0 0
ImClone
Case 154  2 0 0
Case 255  0 1 0
Impath 1 0 0
McKesson HBOC 0 1 0
47 Table 5 does not include verdicts obtained in retrials following a mistrial. Nor does it
include United States v. Causey (Enron Case 4), see infra Appendix 1, at Enron, which
began while this article was in press and was expected to last another three months.
48 United States v. Arthur Andersen, L.L.P, id.
49 United States v. Rice (Enron Broadband Services prosecution), id.
50 United States v. Bayly (Nigerian barge deal prosecution), id.
"l United States v. Scrushy, id. at HealthSouth.
52 United States v. Thomson, id.
53 United States v. Crumpler, id.
54 United States v. Stewart (Martha), id. at ImClone.
55 United States v. Stewart (Larry), id.




Company Convictions Acquittals Mistrials
NewCom 0 1 0
Ogilvy & Mather 2 0 0
Qwest 0 2 2
Rite Aid 1 0 0
Tyco
Case 157 0 0 2
Case 258  0 1 0
Westar Energy 0 0 2
WorldCom 1 0 0
As seen in Table 5, juries arrived at split verdicts in half of the cases in
which multiple defendants were tried. As an initial matter, the verdicts in
the Qwest and Duke Energy trials suggest that the cases were relatively
weak. The juries in both trials split down the middle, acquitting half of the
defendants and deadlocking on the rest. But the picture is incomplete until
we know the ultimate disposition of the charges on which the juries hung.
In the Qwest case, for example, rather than going through the rigors of a
second trial, the two remaining defendants pled guilty and became
cooperating witnesses. Thus, when all was said and done, the government
ultimately prevailed against all four Qwest defendants. Duke Energy, in
contrast, went the opposite way when the prosecutor decided to drop the
remaining charges rather than retry the case.
In two other split verdict cases, Adelphia and Cendant, the juries
convicted half of the defendants and either acquitted or deadlocked on the
others. And in Enron Case 2, five of the six defendants were found guilty
while only one was acquitted. In two of the multiple defendant trials that
did not end with split verdicts, ImClone Case 1 and Ogilvy & Mather, the
juries convicted all of the defendants. In the three remaining non-split
56 See supra note 47.
57 State v. Kozlowski, see infra Appendix 1, at Tyco.
58 State v. Belnick, id.
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verdict trials, hung juries resulted in mistrials for all of the defendants on
trial.5 9
The government's record was equally mixed in cases in which only
one defendant went to trial. Juries in those cases convicted six defendants,
acquitted five, and deadlocked on one.
What explains this mixed trial record? As is true in other contexts,
issues of complexity, witness credibility, juror sophistication, and myriad
unquantifiable factors-including luck--can influence the outcome of a
trial. 60 To illustrate just what can go wrong and how, let's consider what is
perhaps the government's biggest loss to date.
In what once appeared to be one of the strongest fraud cases against a
high-level corporate executive, 61 the prosecution of HealthSouth CEO
Richard Scrushy totally collapsed. While other factors undoubtedly
contributed to the jury's verdict of acquittal, one that clearly stands out is
the indictment itself. Sweeping in its breadth, the more than eighty-count
indictment (later pared down to thirty-six) included multiple charges of
conspiracy, mail and wire fraud, securities fraud (under two different
statutes), false statements, certification of false financial statements
(including attempt), money laundering, obstruction of justice, and perjury.
62
After five months of sometimes mind-numbing testimony during a
leisurely-paced trial, and after weeks of equally leisurely deliberations, the
jury acquitted Scrushy on all counts.
Beyond the issues of complexity and juror boredom in the Scrushy
case lurked the government's heavy reliance on the testimony of former
executives who had pled guilty. 63 Once thought to be a plus because all five
former CFOs were among the cooperating witnesses, 64 reliance onwitnesses who had pled guilty proved to be a liability at trial. In addition to
59 United States v. Rice (Enron Case 3), id. at Enron; State v. Kozlowski (Tyco Case 1),
id. at Tyco; United States v. Wittig (Westar Energy), id. at Westar Energy Inc.
60 These and other related factors that appear to have contributed to mistrials in corporate
fraud prosecutions are considered in Part Ill.
61 Reed Abelson & Jonathan Glater, A Style That Connected With Hometown Jurors,
N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2005, at Cl; Kyle Whitmire, Jurors Doubted Scrushy's Colleagues,
N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2005, at C5 [hereinafter Whitmire, Jurors Doubted Scrushy's
Colleagues]. By the time Scrushy went to trial, fifteen HealthSouth executives, including all
five former CFOs, had pled guilty and become cooperating witnesses.
62 Abelson & Glater, supra note 61; Dan Morse et al., HealthSouth's Scrushy Is
Acquitted: Outcome Shows Challenges for Sarbanes-Oxley Act: SEC Suit Still Ahead; No
Job Offer From Company, WALL ST. J., June 29, 2005, at Al; Kyle Whitmire, Determined to
Find Guilt. But Expecting Acquittal, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2005, at C5.
63 Morse et al., supra note 62; Whitmire, Jurors Doubted Scrushy's Colleagues, supra
note 61.
64 See supra note 61.
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doubting those witnesses, who had something to gain because of their plea
deals with the prosecutors, jurors further questioned the credibility of one
who was a tax cheat,65 of another who took antidepressants, and of yet
another who cheated on his wife.66 Prosecutors were also disadvantaged by
the lack of a paper trail directly linking Scrushy to the fraud,67 an
unfortunate choice of venue,68 Scrushy's waging of an effective public
relations campaign before and during the trial,69 and-believe it or not-the
lack of fingerprint evidence. v
The Scrushy trial exemplified the adage that if something can go
wrong, it will. But the combination of factors that contributed to Scrushy's
acquittal cannot, standing alone, explain why the government has won so
few cases at trial.
III. MISTRIALS
Prosecutors want-and often rightly expect-to win cases, and it goes
without saying that convictions are wins and acquittals are not. But what
about mistrials? When a jury is deadlocked and cannot decide whether to
convict or acquit, should this be counted as a serious loss for the
prosecution? Or is it merely a draw?
According to conventional wisdom, mistrials are defeats for the
government, particularly in high-profile prosecutions. When the jury
deadlocked in the obstruction of justice case against former CSFB star
banker Frank Quattrone, for example, observers called the mistrial "a
65 Morse et al., supra note 62.
66 Id.; Whitmire, Jurors Doubted Scrushy's Colleagues, supra note 61.
67 Abelson & Glater, supra note 61.
68 Morse et al., supra note 62.
69 Whitmire, Jurors Doubted Scrushy's Colleagues, supra note 61. For the latest bizarre
twist on the public relations front, see Evan Perez & Corey Dade, Scrushy Denies Trying to
Buy Support: HealthSouth Ex-CEO Paid PR Firm, Writer and Pastor During His Criminal
Trial, WALL ST. J., Jan. 20, 2006, at A12, and Simon Romero & Kyle Whitmire, Writer Says
Scrushy PaidHer to Write Favorable Articles, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2006, at C3.
70 Abelson & Glater, supra note 61; Morse et al., supra note 62; Simon Romero & Kyle
Whitmire, Former Chief of HealthSouth Acquitted in $2.7 Billion Fraud: Case Fails to Sway
Jury in Scrushy's Hometown, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2005, at Al; Chad Terhune & Dan
Morse, Why Scrushy Won His Trial and Ebbers Lost, WALL ST. J., June 30, 2005, at Cl;
Kyle Whitmire, Determined to Find Guilt, but Expecting Acquittal, N.Y. TIMES, June 29,
2005, at C5; Whitmire, Jurors Doubted Scrushy's Colleagues, supra note 61; cf Linda
Deutsch, "CSI" and "Law & Order" Lead Jurors to Great Expectations, ST. Louis POST-
DISPATCH, Jan. 30, 2006, at Dl (describing how "CS" effect has given jurors unrealistic




serious setback" for the prosecution team.71 Similarly, the hung jury in the
Enron Broadband trial was termed a "big zero" for the government that
would provide "a major confidence boost" to defense lawyers in coming
high profile trials, including that of Enron's Jeff Skilling and Ken Lay.72
Others called the Broadband mistrial a setback and a "second blow" for the
Enron prosecutors, 73 coming as it did on the heels of the Supreme Court's
reversal of Arthur Andersen's obstruction of justice conviction.74
Thus we turn to the question of how many and which of the
government's cases ended in mistrials and what the mistrials signify. Let's
begin with a thumbnail sketch of the eight prosecutions that resulted in a
mistrial on at least some of the charges.
* Adelphia: Adelphia founder John Rigas, his sons Timothy and
Michael, and Michael Mulcahey-all Adelphia executives-were charged
with looting the company of more than $100 million.75 The jury found John
and Timothy guilty, Mulcahey not guilty, and deadlocked on the charges
against Michael Rigas.
' Cendant: Cendant Chairman of the Board Walter Forbes and
Executive Vice President and Vice Chairman Kirk Shelton were accused of
inflating revenue at CUC International 76 by $500 million. The jury
convicted Shelton but could not reach a verdict on the charges against
Forbes.
* CSFB: Frank Quattrone, Head of CSFB's Global Technologies
Group, was tried on three counts of obstruction of justice for ordering the
destruction of files. A hung jury resulted in a mistrial.
* Duke Energy: Three Duke energy trading executives were charged
with manipulating the company's gas and power trades and falsifying its
books to increase reported profits. One defendant, who pled guilty and
became a cooperating witness, did not go to trial. Of the two who were
tried, the jury acquitted one on all charges, but returned a partial verdict for
71 Andrew Ross Sorkin, Hung Jury Ends Trial of Banker: Setback for Prosecution of
Misconduct on Wall St., N.Y. TiMES, Oct. 25, 2003, at Al.
72 John R. Emshwiller, Federal Jury Declines to Convict at an Enron Trial, WALL ST. J.,
July 21, 2005, at C4.
73 Mary Flood, Broadband Trial: The Outcome; No Guilty Verdicts in Latest Enron
Case; Results of Fraud Case Spell Trouble for Prosecutors in Future Trials, Legal Experts
Say, Hous. CHRON., July 21, 2005, at Al [hereinafter Flood, No Guilty Verdicts].
74 See supra note 15.
75 The defendants were accused of treating the company like a "private piggy bank."
Peter Grant et al., Prosecutors Say Rigases Stole from Adelphia, WALL ST. J., Mar. 2, 2004,
at C4.
76 CUC merged with HFS Inc. to fo-m Cendant. Both defendants were high-level
executives at CUC as well.
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the other, acquitting him on some charges but deadlocking on others. The
judge declared a mistrial on the unresolved charges.
. Enron: The government charged seven executives of Enron
Broadband Services with misrepresenting the value and business
capabilities of the internet venture. Two of the seven pled guilty and
became cooperating witnesses, while the other five went to trial. The jury
returned partial verdicts of acquittal for three of the defendants, but could
not reach a verdict on the remaining charges against them. The jury also
deadlocked on all of the charges against the remaining two defendants.
- Qwest: Four executives of Qwest Communications were accused of
inflating the company's revenue by more than $100 million. The jury
acquitted two of the executives but deadlocked on charges against the other
two.
. Tyco: The six-month trial of Tyco CEO Dennis Kozlowski and CFO
Mark Swartz for looting the company of $600 million ended in a mistrial.
* Westar Energy: The jury could not reach a verdict in the trial of
Westar's CEO and its Executive Vice President for looting the utility
company.
Conventional wisdom holds that cases ending in mistrials are marginal
to begin with.77 But how do prosecutors view them? On the one hand, it
seems safe to assume that prosecutors would think twice before devoting
scarce resources to retrying cases they thought they would lose. On the
other hand, if these cases are not necessarily weak to begin with, how can
we explain why more than a third have ended in mistrials?
To put this question in context, let's look first at the circumstances
surrounding the inconclusive results in the Tyco, Enron Broadband, and
CSFB trials.
Juror Publicity: Technically speaking, Tyco ended in a mistrial
because of publicity surrounding a courtroom incident in which a juror
reportedly gave an "O.K." sign to the defense table.78 I say "technically"
77 Michael Graczyk, Jury Acquits Former Enron Execs of Some Charges and Deadlocks
on Others, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, July 21, 2005, at C3 (noting that the jury's inability to
reach a verdict "tells us something of the government's use of its resources in this case"
(quoting Barry Pollack, a lawyer for one of the defendants)); Thor Valdmanis, Quattrone
Mistrial Doesn't Bode Well for Future Cases, USA TODAY, Oct. 26, 2003, available at
http://www.usatoday.com/money/industries/brokerage/2003-10-26-quattronex.htm
(predicting that the government's decision whether to retry Quattrone would signal that
prosecutors would be "less aggressive" in pursuing questionable cases (quoting Jack Sylvia,
a partner at Mintz Levin, who was not involved in the case)).
78 David Carr & Adam Liptak, In Tyco Trial, an Apparent Gesture Has Many Meanings:
Publicity to Prompt Mistrial Motion, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 29, 2004, at C1; Mark Maremont &
Kara Scannell, Tyco Jury Resumes Deliberating: Defense Fails in Mistrial Bid Based on
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because the atmosphere during jury deliberations had become
"poisonous, 79 and it appeared that the juror would be a holdout in any
event.80 But the contentious deliberations were partly a byproduct of a
failed prosecution strategy that allowed the six-month trial to be dominated
at times by lavish lifestyle evidence that had little to do with proving the
charges against Kozlowski and Swartz,"' and at other times to become
bogged down in complexity. 82 In what must have been a mind-numbing
experience, the jury heard testimony from forty-eight witnesses and
considered some seven hundred exhibits.
Truncated Deliberations: The Enron Broadband trial ended in a
mistrial when the jury declared itself deadlocked after only four days of
deliberations. g3 Over those four days, the jury had reached not guilty
verdicts on twenty-four counts of the indictment, but declared itself
deadlocked on the remaining 168 charges. To some observers, declaring a
mistrial so early in deliberations that followed a lengthy, complex case with
nearly two hundred charges against five defendants seemed a bit "quick on
Media Coverage of Juror, but Incident Could Fuel Appeal, WALL ST. J., Mar. 30, 2004, at
Cl.
79 Mark Maremont et al., Mistrial Scuttles Possible Guilty Verdicts in Tyco Case: Jurors
Criticize Prosecution, Defense for Clumsy Tactics; Lessons Learned for Retrial, WALL ST.
J., Apr. 5, 2004, at Al.
80 Andrew Ross Sorkin, Juror No. 4 Says No O.K. Sign and No Guilty Vote, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 7, 2004, at Al.
81 Mark Maremont & Chad Bray, Tyco Trial Jurors Say Defendants Weren't Credible:
Conviction of Kozlowski, Swartz Highlights Risk of Executives' Testifying, WALL ST. J., June
20, 2005, at Al [hereinafter Maremont & Bray, Tyco Defendants Weren't Credible]. The
evidence included video tapes of a bacchinale-like birthday bash in Sardinia (underwitten in
part by Tyco) and a virtual tour of a posh New York apartment (also paid for by Tyco)
equipped with exotic furnishings that included a now notorious $6,000 shower curtain. John
Schwartz, I Don't Want to Calculate the Cost to Matriculate, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2005, § 3,
at 26.
82 Pete McEntegart, One Angry Man: A Juror Gives An Inside Account of Why the Tyco
Trial Fell Apart, TIME, Apr. 12, 2004, at 47 (noting that the jury heard testimony from 48
witnesses, that more than 700 exhibits had been introduced, and that the testimony produced
more than 12,000 pages of transcript). Maremont & Bray, Tyco Defendants Weren't
Credible, supra note 81. Both men were later sentenced to lengthy prison terms. Andrew
Ross Sorkin, Ex-Tyco Officers Get 8 to 25 Years: 2 Sentenced in Crackdown on White-
Collar Crime, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 2005, at Al (reporting that Kozlowski and Swartz were
both sentenced to serve 8 1/3 to 25 years in prison). The two men were remanded to custody
immediately after they were sentenced, and the judge refused to release them on bail pending
appeal. Bail Denied to Two Tyco Executives, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2005, at C2.
83 John R. Emshwiller, Federal Jury Declines to Convict at an Enron Trial, WALL ST. J.,
July 21, 2005, at C4. Not surprisingly, the prosecutors strenuously objected to such an early
end to the deliberations.
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the trigger.' '84 Indeed, the judge's abrupt halt to the deliberations prompted
one defense lawyer to complain that "[t]here was no logic to this at all."' 5
Witness Credibility: In the CSFB trial, although three jurors
steadfastly held out for an acquittal, others vacillated on the question of
guilt.8 6  After the mistrial was declared, one juror posited that the only
reason Frank Quattrone had not been acquitted was his decision to take the
stand. The credibility of his testimony was seriously compromised during
cross-examination, when the government produced e-mails that
contradicted his testimony in chief.8 7 "He did a bad job going up there....
I heard a lot of jurors say if he hadn't been a witness, it would have been
'not guilty' the first day."88 Thus, in contrast with the Tyco trial, in which
the prosecutors' trial strategy may have backfired with the jury, the defense
decision to put Quattrone on the stand appears to have been a pivotal
strategic mishap in the jury's eyes.89
84 Flood, No Guilty Verdicts, supra note 73 (quoting Robert Mintz, a frequent legal
commentator on high profile white collar trials). But see Vioxx Case Leads to Hung Jury:
Retrial Planned in 2001 Death, WASH. POST., Dec. 13, 2005, at A10 (mistrial declared in
first federal Vioxx trial after jury had just begun fourth day of deliberations; judge had
admonished jury to reach a verdict in a "reasonable time" and declared that "[i]t has now
been a reasonable time [and w]e cannot get a verdict"); Alex Berenson, A Mistrial Is
Declared in 3rd Suit Over Vioxx, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2005, at C l (mistrial declared in first
federal Vioxx trial after jury deliberated eighteen hours over three days).
85 Flood, No Guilty Verdicts, supra note 73 (quoting defense lawyer Ed Tomko, who
represented one of the defendants in the case).
86 Randall Smith & Kara Scannell, Inside Quattrone Jury Room, Discord Culminates in
Mistrial, WALL ST. J., Oct. 27, 2003, at Al.
87 Id.
88 Andrew Ross Sorkin, Quattrone Juror Says Three Wouldn't Budge, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
27, 2003, at Cli. Credibility was also a factor in the retrial of Tyco's Kozlowski and
Swartz. Maremont & Bray, supra note 81.
89 Evidently believing that-like the prosecutors in the Tyco case-he had learned from
his mistakes, Quattrone testified again in his second trial. This strategic move came at a
price, however, because his admission of knowledge of the contents of the e-mails produced
in the first trial also served to undermine the fundamental basis for his claimed innocence.
To the surprise of his supporters, the jury returned guilty verdicts after less than a day of
deliberations. Randall Smith, In Quattrone Case, 'Nice' Prosecutor Wins: Jurors Checked
Emotions at the Door, WALL ST. J., May 4, 2004, at Cl; Randall Smith, Quattrone Found
Guilty on 3 Counts in Big U.S. Win: Former CSFB Star Banker Could Face 2 Years in Jail;
A Case Built on E-Mail, WALL ST. J., May 4, 2004, at Al; Andrew Ross Sorkin, Wall St.
Banker Is Found Guilty of Obstruction, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 2004, at Al. The decision
whether to put the defendant on the stand may, of course, be pivotal in trials in which juries
reach unanimous verdicts. In the prosecution against WorldCom CEO Bernie Ebbers, for
example, his decision to testify hurt more than it helped. Jesse Drucker & Li Yuan, 'How
Could He Not See?': Documents Swayed Ebbers Jury, WALL ST. J., Mar. 17, 2005, at Cl;
Jonathan D. Glater & Ken Belson, Ebbers, on Witness Stand, May Have Lost His Case,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2005, at C1. And jurors in the retrial of Tyco executives Dennis
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Complexity: As mentioned before, prosecutors in the Tyco trial
allowed the case to become bogged down in complexity, and that
undoubtedly contributed to the jury's inability to reach a verdict for or
against either Kozlowski or Swartz.
Perhaps demonstrating that mistrials can be a blessing for whoever
performed the worst at trial, 90 the Tyco prosecutors learned from their
mistakes. On retrial, they trimmed the number of witnesses by half and
scrapped much of the lifestyle and spending. evidence. Although the second
trial still consumed about four months and jury deliberations continued for
eleven days, the prosecutors were vindicated in the end. Handing the
prosecutors a major win, the jury convicted both Kozlowski and Swartz.
Federal prosecutors have been similarly plagued by charging practices
that often make trials overly complex. The trial of four Qwest executives
on a forty-four count indictment for conspiracy, securities fraud, false
statements, and wire fraud ended in disappointment for prosecutors when
the jury acquitted two of the defendants and deadlocked on charges against
the other two. Afterward, jurors expressed annoyance that the government
seemingly "threw everything" at the defendants and "hoped something
would stick"91 and said the overall case was hard to understand.92
Not long after the end of that trial, the ongoing fraud investigation
culminated in the December 2005 indictment of Qwest CEO Joseph
Nacchio. But this time, the charges were surprisingly focused. While
similar in one respect to the earlier Qwest indictment-Nacchio was
charged with forty-three counts-it was different in that all of the charges
Kozlowski and Mark Swartz concluded that neither defendant was a credible witness and
that Swartz came across as "a really good liar" on the stand. Maremont & Bray, Tyco Trial
Defendants Weren't Credible, supra note 81.
In contrast, post-verdict comments after the Martha Stewart trial suggested that the
decision not to put the defendants on the stand was a "serious mistake." Jonathan D. Glater,
Defense Gambled, and Lost, With a Minimal Presentation, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2004, at B 1.
As one juror put it, "How could we tell anything about how smart either of them was if they
never took the stand?" Id. And then there was the possibility that her failure to tell the jury
her side of the story created the impression that she was arrogant or aloof. As another juror
posited, "[By not testifying, Stewart] seemed to say: 'I don't have anything to worry about. I
fooled the jury. I don't have anything to prove."' Memorandum of Law in Support of
Martha Stewart's Motion for New Trial Pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33,
at 14, United States v. Stewart, S1-03-Cr-717 (MGC) (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2004) (on file with
author).
90 Carrie Johnson, For Prosecutors, Shorter Is Sweeter: Government Got Chance To
Analyze, Fix Mistakes, WASH. POST, June 18, 2005, at D1.
91 Shawn Young & Dionne Searcey, Qwest's Ex-CEO Is Charged in Probe of Insider
Trading, WALL ST. J., Dec. 21, 2005, at A3.
92 Ken Belson, U.S. Tries Simpler Tack Against Ex-Chief of Qwest, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20,
2006, at C3.
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were insider trading allegations. Although the charges are ultimately tied to
what Nacchio knew about Qwest's financial outlook, which he publicly
painted as rosy while he privately knew it was grim, the indictment does not
try to link him to the underlying accounting fraud. And by focusing on just
one crime, the government increases its chances of proving a pattern of
illegal activity-repeatedly selling stock on the basis of inside
information-which in theory should make it easier to convict. Simply put,
this change in charging strategy simplifies the case for the jury.93 Indeed,
one securities lawyer commented that the government may well be using
the strategy it successfully employed in several previous prosecutions. "If
you look at Bernie Ebbers, Adelphia, and Martha Stewart, the government
has done an exceptional job when they keep it simple so juries
understand.,
94
These glimpses at the dynamics of several high-profile trials provide
possible, perhaps plausible, explanations for the outcomes. But at the end
of the day, we can only speculate on the myriad reasons why these cases
resulted in mistrials and partial acquittals. That said, we do have data that
facilitate a relatively informed analysis of whether the mistrials signaled
failed criminal prosecutions.
What happened after the mistrials were declared? Did the government
give up because it thought the cases were losers? Or did the prosecutors
persevere? The data in Table 6 tell a compelling story.
In seven of the eight cases that ended in mistrials, prosecutors signaled
their intention to retry the defendants.95 The government's decision to retry
most, if not all, of the defendants indicates that prosecutors have a greater
degree of confidence in the merits of the cases than one might otherwise
93 Id.; Young & Searcey, supra note 91.
94 Christopher Palmeri, The Case Against Qwest's Nacchio: The Telecom 's Former CEO
Has Finally Been Indicted-For Fraud and Insider Trading. Getting a Conviction Will Be
No Slam Dunk, BUSINESSWEEK ONLINE, Dec. 24, 2005, http://www.businessweek.com/
technology/content/dec2005/tc20051221_927069.htm.
The prosecutors have also streamlined their cases for the retrial of defendants in the
Enron Broadband Services case (see Mary Flood, Five Former Enron Execs Reindicted,
Hous. CHRON., Nov. 10, 2005, at BI) and the trial of Enron's Skilling and Lay. Alexei
Barriounuevo, Prosecutors Shift Focus on Enron, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 11, 2006, at Cl; Kurt
Eichenwald, Big Test Looms for Prosecutors at Enron Trial, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2006, at
Al; Mary Flood, Government Plans to Trim Witness List, Hous. CHRON., Dec. 2, 2005, at
B4.
95 When the mistrial was declared in the Duke Energy case, it was uncertain whether the
remaining defendant would be retried, see Mistrial in Case of Former Duke Energy
Executive, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 10, 2005, at B2, but the prosecutor ultimately decided to drop
the remaining charges. Peter Geier, A Defense Win in the Heart of Enron Country, NAT'L
L.J., Jan. 23, 2006, at 6.
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expect. That logically raises the question whether their confidence is
warranted. What outcomes flow from the decision to retry?
Table 6
































The answer is fairly straightforward. To date, prosecutors have
enjoyed considerable success after mistrials were declared. As seen in
Table 6, defendants in two cases pled guilty to avoid the perils of a retrial,
and in three of the four retrials, the juries convicted all the remaining
defendants. 96 None of the retried defendants has been acquitted.
96 Retrials of the Enron Broadband Services defendants are scheduled for 2006.
Company
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After the Cendant retrial ended with a second hung jury, one might
reasonably have expected the prosecutor to throw in the towel. But it seems
that a majority of the jury had favored conviction and that the prosecutor
would gear up for another new trial, so the judge set a tentative date for a
second retrial.97
Simply put, the results in three of the retrials are wins for the
prosecution, and the fourth is a draw. Thus, prosecutors must surely-and
perhaps, justifiably-view their success rate following mistrials as a
vindication of the initial decision to prosecute.
IV. CONCLUSION
The corporate fraud prosecution cycle following Enron's collapse has
produced an unparalleled number of criminal trials of senior corporate
executives in just three years. While guilty pleas and cooperation
agreements are strategically significant in developing these cases, the
number of CEOs, CFOs, and other senior managers who have been charged
and tried belies critics' assertions that mid-level managers who plead guilty
become scapegoats, while their superiors go scot free.
Although at first glance the results of the corporate fraud trials seem
surprisingly mixed, we have seen that the government enjoys a respectable,
if not spectacular, conviction rate; that prosecutors, ever confident of the
underlying merits of cases that end in mistrials, are far from reluctant to
retry them; and that prosecutors' willingness and ability to shift strategies to
secure convictions has paid off handsomely to date. The corporate fraud
trials have also provided a unique opportunity to gain insights into
prosecutorial charging practices in high profile white collar cases, to
observe and evaluate trial strategies and dynamics, and to tentatively assess
what seems to work (or not) and why.
The showcase trial of Enron's Skilling and Lay will not be the end of
the road. Dozens of executives charged in similar fraud prosecutions are
now awaiting trial, and additional fraud investigations are clearly underway.
As these cases wend their way through the system, they will further
enhance our understanding of the utility (or futility, as the case may be) of
relying on individual criminal prosecutions to address systemic corporate
fraud.
97 Stacey Stowe, Cendant's Ex-Chairman Faces His Third Trial, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15,
2006, at C15; Cendant Juror Says Most Favored a Conviction, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH,
Feb. 15, 2006, at C2.
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